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PEASANTS, CAPITALISTS AND THE STATE:
MEX ICO'S CHANGING AGRICULTURAL
POLICIES AND THE "HUNGARIAN PROJECT"
Introduction
In the twentieth century a distinctive relationship has
existed between the Mexican state and the country's peasantry.
Since the ejido was established as a l egal person in the
Mexican constitution of 1917, the state has taken the responsibility for directing the fortunes of those peasants who
obtained usufruct rights over land in the agrarian reform
which followed the Mexican Revolution.
the Mexican state has pursued for the

The policies which
ejido~

have suffered

severe problems, including peasant resistancA, bureaucratic
inefficiencies and corruption, entrepreneurial speculation,
private landowners' interference and international market
fluctuations, among others.

During most of the twentieth

century, however, Mexicans managed to feed themselves and to
produce a surplus for export to other countries, primarily
the United States.
In recent decades, the cumulative legacy of these
agrarian problems has become critical.

Consecutive poor

harvests, combined with massive importations of food from
the United States , have placed Mexico's agricultural policies in a new light.

With the onset of the petroleum era
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in the mid-1970s, public awareness of the agrarian crisis
has increased dramatically.

Because the United States is

both Mexico's primary market for petroleum exports and the
source for the foodstuffs which replace sagging domestic
production, Mexicans came to realize that they were trading
a non-renewable patrimony, petroleum, for food which they
historically have produced for themselves.

The image of

a direct exchange of Mexican oil for American grain became a
national nightmare.
It is in this context that Mexican President Jos~ L6pez
Portillo introduced, first,

the

Si~i~ma

Agim~nia~io

~~xicano,

or the Mexican Food System, commonly known as SAM, and later
the

L~y

d~

Tom~nio

Development (LFA).

Ag~op~cua~io,

or the Law of Agricultural

Both SAM and the LFA were subjected to

intense debate regarding the direction which these policies
implied for Mexico's food self-sufficiency.

Outside of

Mexico, these policies were observed with considerable interest, not only by countries like the United States which
sell foodstuffs to Mexico, but also by other Third World
countries which looked to oil-rich Mexico for leadership.
SAM and the LFA were installed during the time I spent
in Mexico in 1980 and 1981.

I followed the national debate

in the media and in conversation and I became involved in an
evaluation of a specific project in the State of Jalisco
which fell under the aegis of these two policies.

This

research paper concerns the first phase of my research on
what has come to be known as the "Hungarian Project".

My

analysis necessarily is preliminary, for various reasons.
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First, the fate of the new policies is not certain, because
President Lopez Portillo will leave office soon and the incoming president will have wide latitude in establishing his
own agricultural policies .

Second, these policies were de-

signed to have long-term effects but have been in operation
a relatively short time.

Finally, the local program which I

will describe was set up for the five year period from 1980
to 1985, but the results of the second annual cycle are not
yet available.

However, the situations I will describe have

implications which go beyond the immediate question of the
success or failure of the policies and program, and in this
sense it is worthwhile to consider them in this early phase
of their evolution.

SAM and the LFA
It is not my intention to discuss SAM and the LFA in
terms of policymaking or "statecraft", as if one could isolate the state from its societal and international contexts.
Rather I intend to discuss SAM and the LFA as aspects of
social relations in Mexico.

I will describe them as poli-

cies in the briefest of terms and then go on to analyze
them in the context of Mexican social relations.
The designation of the Mexican Food System by the acronym of SAM certainly indicates the international significance
of the policy in an era in which "Food Power" and United
States hegemony are virtually synonymous.
a wry sense of humor :

It also indicates

the cartoonist German Malvido,

4

( INGENUO
Por German MAlVIDO

Illustration 1: In genuo
( I ngenuDus) , by Germ~n
Ma lvi do , [l Occidental,
September 17, 1 980 .

Inf raestructura

Illustration 2 :

In t~ae~t~ uc

tu~a (Infrastructure), by
~
L'lra, unoma~uno,
~
V azquez

December 29 , 1980.
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drawing for the Guadalajara newspaper cf Occideniaf, depicted
a Mexican peasant shouting,
Uncle Sam asking meekly,

"Long live SAM!" and a startled

" Who , me?"

(see Illustration 1).

SAM represents an attempt to establish a national food system,
in order to assure food self-sufficiency in the 1980s, throu gh
massive but coordinated infusions of state capital and technical assistance.

In contrast to earlier master plans for

agriculture, SAM employs the perspective of systems theory,2
although with a definite technical rather than social orientation.

It is as if, to cite one of Vazquez Lira's cartoons

in the Mexico City daily unoma~uno, the Mexican state thought
that it could plant

pe~o~

rather than seed in the countryside

and reap increased corn yields (see Illustration

2).

Not all of the components of the Mexican Food System were
immediately disclosed, leading some to call SAM an idea without substance, as in Oswaldo Sagastegui's cartoon in

cxcef~io~,

in which an impoverished peasant stands in front of a picture
labeled SAM and sees nothing but his own reflection.

A tag

hangs to one side saying, "For now we can only offer you
this."

Sagastegui titled the cartoon "Know Yourself" (see

Illustration

3).

More sarcastically, unoma~uno's Alan

represented SAM as a wanted poster, advising the reader that
if he sees it, to take advantage of it (see Illustration

4).

The principal components of SAM are, first, an increase
in the production of staples, especially maize, beans, and
wheat, with subsidies, price supports and crop insurance, in
order to "share the risk" between the state and the peasantry;
and second, an educational program concerning nutrition,
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Conocete
_ - - - - r O R OSWALDO SAGASTEGUI·_ _ _ __

Illustration 3 : Con6c~i~
(Know Yourself), by Oswaldo
Sagas t egui, cxc~g~io~,
Sep t ember 23 , 1980.
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Si 10 ve lprovecho !

Illustration 4: Si go u£
ip~ou£cho! (If you see it,
take advantage!), by Alan ,_
unoma~uno, December 20, 1980.

based upon the concept of the basic food basket, or
~a~ica.

cana~ta

The most radical aspects of the pro g ram are the

immensity of the resources dedicated to it and the fact that
the component programs are coordinated by means of systems
theory.
The Agricultural Development Law or LFA, on the other
hand, is oriented toward increasing the penetration of private capital in the countryside, conceptualized as the
"recapitalization" of agriculture, in response to the flight
of capital from the rural areas to the cities or to the exterior, with consequent effects upon production and employment.

Perhaps the most important aspect of the LFA is the
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creation of newly defined "production units" , in which £jido.6,
or communal landholding units, are encouraged to associate
with small landowners (because by definition there are no
large landowners in Mexic o) or with other £jido.6 for the purpose of solicitin g credit, with favored status for lowinterest loans and other state-sponsored supports.
LFA in effect does is

c~£at£

anoth£~

g£v£g 0/ gand

What the
t£nu~£,

supposedly without affecting l and tenur e at the pre - existing
level, consisting of private and social (i.£.,
property.

the £jido)

The immense significance of the new production

units is that the agrarian reform of the post-revolutionary
period is finished.

From this point forward other solutions

will be found for Mexico's rural ills.

Indeed, many observers

saw the LFA in contradiction to the revolutionary goals of
land and liberty and even in contradiction to SAM , as two of
Alan ' s other cartoons indic ate (see Illustrations 5 and

6).

The response of different social and econom ic int erests
in Mexico followed more or less predictable lin es.

The sup-

port of private enterprise for SAM would be surprising in itself, for SAM attempts to reorient agricultural production
t oward staples and away from luxury export products , which
have been the backbone of modern capitalist agriculture in
Mexico.

SAM , however , does not stand by itself, but in rela-

tion to the LFA and other state policies.

As it became evi-

dent that the state was not going to grea tl y affect land
tenure, in the sense of expropria tin g the remaining latifundia, and that money could be made by all, the support of
private enterprise was not slow in coming.

- - - - - - --

Although SAM
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.SentidQ contrario

Illustration 5 : S.entido
(Wrong Way). by
Alan, unoma-6uno, December
12, 1980.
Cont~a~io

i-Camara!

Illustration 6:
jCama~a!
(Camera!), by Alan, unoma-6uno, October 17, 1980.
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preceded the LFA by almost a year, the LFA was being discussed during this entire period.
No way exists to monitor the opinions of Mexican peasants
as a whole toward SAM and the LFA.

The principal peasant

organizations, such as the National Peasant Federation
(Contede~aci6n Nacionaf Campe4ina,

or CNC), are effectively

controlled by the hegemonic political party, the Institutional
Revolutionary Party

(Pa~iido Revofuciona~io

In4iiiucionaf, or

PRI), and cannot be said to have an autonomous voice.

Indeed,

no peasant groups had significant roles in designing either
policy.
The peasants with whom I spoke in Jalisco about SAM and
the LFA for the main part claimed not to know what SAM entailed,
which is not surprising, because few non-peasants knew what
SAM meant, beyond the general concept.

They saw it as just

another state program, this time infused with nationalism,
as suggested in Malvido's cartoon.

The peasants responded

most directly to the provision of SAM that rewards the production of basic grains.

They knew the LFA somewhat better,

because the state presented seminars in the ejido4 to explain
what this new law meant, especially the production units.
The purpose of these seminars was not to elicit the opinions
of peasants toward the LFA, but to present this ready-made
law to them.
The Mexican middle classes, who are increasingly removed
from the issues of food production, responded to both SAM
and the LFA with nationalistic zeal.

A typical response is

that of a young man who responded with horror when his sister
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expressed skepticism at home about SAM .

" What? " he said.

"Are you in favor of the privatization (i.e.,
of private property) in the countryside?"

the expansion

As this comment

indicates, it is easy to confuse the ostensive goa l

of SAM

with its effects.
The political left was cautiously hopeful about SAM ,
except for some who dismissed it altogether, as some of them
had been involved in the studies which led to its formulation.

Their response to the LFA, however, was unanimously

negative.

Another of Alan's cartoons in unoma~uno shows a

modern cattleman reaching for his holster, where he has a
copy of the Agricultural Development Law instead of a gun.
In his belt he carries a copy of the Law of Agrarian Protection (a sort of agrarian ha~ea~ co~pu~ which allows landowners to assure that their properties will not be expropriated by the state). The rancher is saying, "At these
[expletive deleted] Indians, one must toss the printed word!"
(see Illustration 7).
What must be remembered in" attempting to understand
these policies in their social and historical context is that
all social issues or questions have been subordinated to
technical ones, as Warman has suggested in terms of a transition from an agrarian policy, or pol~t;ca ag~a~ia, to an
agricultural policy, or pol[tica ag~~cola.3

This transition

in turn must be seen in terms of Mexico's evolving domestic
and international situation.

There is no question that the

crisis that led to the introduction of SAM and the LFA was
the deterioration of food self-sufficiency i n the 1970s and
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Ganadero moderno

Illustration 7: 9anadeno
(Modern Cattleman),
by Alan, unoma~uno, December
1,1980 .

~odenno

.Epidemia ·

Illustration 8: cpidemia
(Epidemic), by Alan, unoma~uno, September 19, 1980.
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the necessity on the part of the Mexican state to pay for
imported food with petroleum.

Both types of transaction

were carried on primarily with the United States.

The

specter of Mexico squandering its national wealth and ending
up in the same relative condition 40 years from now

hastened

the introduction of the SAM concept before it was fully
elaborated.

One of Alan's more poignant cartoons shows

American gra ins dressed as tourists showing up at a Pemex
(Pet~6teo~ ~exicano~)

dispensary and asking politely whether

this is the place where petroleum is exchanged for gra ins
(see Illustration 8) .

SAM was introduced on the eighteenth

of March , 1980, the anniversary of the expropriation of the
Mexican petroleum industry by then-Pr es ident Cardenas, which
is celebrated as a holiday in Mexico.

At the same time,

President Lopez Portillo announced that Mexico would not join
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and that
the country's daily production of crude oil would be limited,
thus controlling its sale to foreign countries, particularly
the United States.

4

At first and taken by itself, SAM seemed to suggest that
Mexico would take a nationalist path of development, turnin g
away from foreign capital, primarily North American, as the
motor of development.

SAM, the LFA and other state policies

emphasize that production must occur, in whatever units can
get the job done.
in the

ejido~

Even if noncapitalist production relations

produce a lar ge share of the country's staples,

the industrial and marketing complexes that use these products remain in hands, whether private or state, that are
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committed to a more modern,

capitalistic Mexico, in which

the state and private enterprise together direct the
econ omy 's course.

Those who stand to lose the most are the

intermediaries who have fed parasitically from the labor of
Mexican peasants.

Again, Alan gives us a cartoon on this

subject, showing SAM digging a grave for the intermediaries
and the intermediaries digging a grave for SAM (see Illustration 9).
A final comment reinforces the interpretation of SAM
and the LFA presented in this report.

Early in 1981, Presi-

dent Lopez Portillo opened a public debate concernin g t he
role of private property in Mexico.

In his opening sally,

he suggested that Mexicans reevaluate the "social function"
of private property.

He seemed to suggest that Mexico could

do away with private property, if the people so desired.

As

this multi-sided debate developed, it quickly became apparent
that private property was not the issue at stake.

The true

concern of the debate was social property, that is, the
ejido.
ciona~io

In the technocratic rhetoric of the
In~titucionag,

Pa~tido

Revogu-

the debate seemed to signify that

Mexico could no longer afford the foolish luxury of the
ejido.

It is significant that peasant and ejido leaders

were not consulted in the planning of either SAM or the LFA,
that none of these leaders attended the state party celebrating the first anniversary of SAM, and that at the First
National Congress on Maize, held in Guadalajara, no peasant
or ejido representatives participated in the panels, which
were wholly technical in orientation.
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Illustration 9: S£pu~t£~o~ (Gravediggers), by Alan, unoma~uno, January
26, 1981.

The "Hungarian Project"
Most of what has been written about SAM and the LFA
concerns the policy implications of President Lopez Portillo's
initiatives, especially regarding relations with the United
States.

Relatively little has been written about specific

projects in which SAM and the LFA had some impact upon the
peasants who produce Mexico's food.

My intention in this

section is to provide a preliminary analysis of the first
phase of one such project, known locally as the "Hungarian
Project" in the State of Jalisco.
It may be worth noting that Jalisco, as part of the
Mexican West, presents certain specific conditions which are
unlike those of central, southern and northern Mexico, where
most research on agrarian life has been conducted.

What is
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now Jalisco did not have dense populations of indi genous
groups at the time of the Spanish Conquest, and no preColumbian empire existed.

The Indian groups found there

were largely exterminated, except in the area around Lake
Chapala and in the northern part of the state.
ethnic

Consequently,

have evolved along a somewhat different

r~lations

trajectory than in other areas of Mexico.

The Indians did

not become subjected to harsh conditions of coerced labor on
haciendas, at least not to the same extent as in other regions.

Most of contemporary Jalisco belonged not to Nueva

Espana but to Nueva Galicia, and what is true of the former
is not necessarily true of the latter, in both historical and
contemporary times.

The lack of a suitable labor force im-

peded the development of latifundia and the haciendas of the
region specialized in raising livestock in addition to
staples.

Small-scale private property still is quite preva-

lent in Jalisco, especially in the area known as Los Altos de
Jalisco, a primary locus of the Cristero Rebellion of the
1920s and 1930s.
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Jalisco was not a hotbed of the Mexican

Revolution, nor were the pressures for agrarian reform as
strong there as in other regions.

In many ways, the state

is quite conservative and it has been called the most Catholic of the Mexican states.
The "Hungarian Project" was designed for the Union of
[jI-do/; "Francisco 1. Madero" in the municipali ty of Jocotepec,

which lies immediately to the west of Lake Chapala.

The

union was formed several years ago, during the administration
of former President Luis Echeve rria, who supported the
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development of associat i ons of in dependent ~j ido~.
union cons i sts of four ~jido~ :

6

Thi s

Zapotitan de Hidalgo ,

Hue j otitan , EI Mo lin o and San Marcos .

7

The first three ~j id o~

were formed from th e f ormer haciendas of Huejot itan and
Zapotitan , whi ch earlie r constituted a s i ng l e hacienda ,
Huejotitan, that occupied th e entir e valley.

Thi s hacienda

was divided by inheritance into the two haciendas of Huejo titan and Zapotitan.
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Durin g the agrarian reform, t hese

haciendas were divided int o thr ee

~jido~,

tw o of whic h carry

the names of the old haciendas, a lt hough the boundar i es of
t he hac i endas were not stri ctly observed in demarcating the
new

~jido~ .

EI Mo lin o i s that part of the o l d Hac i enda de

Hu e j ot i tan where wheat was mill ed before be i ng shi pped to
Guadalajara.
Any anthropo l ogist could have pred i cted that a union
which brought together the two ~ jido ~ of Huejot itan and Zapo titan would encoun t er great difficulties,

as these two ~j id o~

have sustain ed competition and hos tiliti es from before the
tim e they were constituted as

~j ido~,

perhaps dating to th e

time the Hac i enda de Huejotitan was divided.

In fact,

one

could hardly ask for a more suitabl e case for cont r oll ed com par i son .

Zapoti tan i s a we ll- organ iz ed ~j id o , wi t h effect i ve

l eadership , that has managed t o intr oduce substan ti a l i mprove ments i n the comm unity without depending upon, as th ey say ,

papa

gogi~~no.

Among th ese i mp rovement s are potabl e water ,

electricity, a commun it y p l aza , a bridge , a paved yard and ,
most im por t ant l y , a building for
known as the

ca~a

~jidag.

~jido

offices and meetings ,

The community has both primary and
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secondary schools and also a small clinic operated by the
Ministry of Health.
In contrast, nearby Huejotitan achieved some of these
improvements only after Zapotitan had done so, and then only
with governmental help, not on the basis of their own efforts.
In Huejotitan, ejido meetings are held in the local primary
school, as they have no ca~a ejidaf.

The youth of Huejotitan

who want to attend school beyond the primary level must go
to the school in Zapotitan or must leave the area to live
with relatives or friends in places like Guadalajara.

As a

consequence, there are only a very few students from Huejotitan
in the secondary school in Zapotitan.

With regard to medical

care, the only local option to the clinic in Zapotitan is a
larger facility in the town of Jocotepec.
These two communities differ decisively in

l~adership,

which reflects the competing interests in the respective communities.

[jidata~io~

with cattle and other livestock are

more powerful in Huejotitan than in Zapotitan and because
they want to maintain the extensive exploitation of ejido
lands, they can be counted on to oppose any project that would
change the existing patterns of exploitation.
ejidata~io~

There are

with livestock in Zapotitan, but they appear less

able to prevail in community decisions.
tion in Zapotitan consists of

One important fac-

non-ejidata~io~

who nonetheless

attend the monthly ejido meetings and push for their particular interests.

Zapotitan also appears to be better organized

with regard to the outside world, as they have strong contacts in various cities on this side of the border, to whom
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they refer as "our people."
The ejido leader, or

comi~a~io

ejidae, in Huejotitan

durin g the period of this initial study was a man whom I will
call Felipe Estevez, a charismatic and mysterious man who
appears to hold sway in Huejotitan through fear.

Felipe is

articulate and impressive and he manages the ejido meetings
with considerable skill.

He is equally adept at expressing

a critical evaluation of the government's manipulation of
his community as he is at "playing peasant" and denying any
knowledge of the vertical links within Mexican society.
The effective leader in Zapotitan was Juan Arroyo (also
a pseudonym), who held the two important positions of comi~a~io

ejidae and

p~e~idenie

of the union of

in 1981, Juan relinquished the former role.

ejido~.

Early

He is less

charismatic than Felipe and exercises his influence more subtly.

Rather than directing his ejido's monthly meetings,

Juan avoids intervention until it is unavoidable and then he
does it with underspoken skill.
This is the context which existed in Jocotepec at the
time of the introduction of the "Hungarian Project."

The

Mexican government signed an agreement for scientific and
technical cooperation with the Hungarian government in late

1 977.

This agreement included a "Special Agreement for Cooper-

ation in the Area of Agriculture and Forestry," under which
this project falls.

Since Hungary is one of Europe's leading

corn producers, for which they have developed considerable
expertise, it was logical that Hungary attempt to share its
knowledge with Mexico, which also is an important producer of
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corn, but with much less expertise.

The Hungarian goverment

assigned the task of educating Mexican peasants in advanced
techniques of corn cultivation to the consulting firm of
AGROBER.
The agronomists of AGROBER designed a five-year project.
In the first phase, correspoding to the 1980-81 agricultural
cycle, they would increase the production of corn by applying
the techniques which they had perfected in Hungary, with adaptations for the conditions of this area.

To do this, they

prepared the soil to a greater extent than the Mexican peasants had done:

they plowed twice at 30 centimeters and

applied various types and quantities of fertilizers.

They

planted four types of improved seeds at a density of 48,000
plants per hectare, an increase of about 25 percent.

They

used the pesticide Furadan and seven types of herbicides,
some applied by airplane.
ticated and expensive.

The machinery they used was sophis-

In addition to increased corn output,

the first phase contemplated the collection and sale of
bundled corn stalks as forage

(paca~).

The second phase was to build upon the first by using
the

paca~

to feed the increased livestock population of the

Qjidata~io~.

This phase was to include intensive livestock

raising in feedlots.

In subsequent phases, the union was to

become transformed into an autonomous agroindustry, incorporating corn cultivation, livestock raising and meat processing in the same locale, providing more skilled employment
and greater remuneration for union members.

At the same time,

this development would impede outmigration from the area to
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Guadalajara, Mexico City and the United States.
Originally , the project was to encompass all four

ejldo~

of the union, but due to a last minute decision in the Mexican
Ministry of Agriculture, the scope of the project was limited
to three contiguous ejldo~, Huejotit~n,

Zapotit~n and El Molin6,

and was renamed a "pilot project," involving only 1,000 of the
ejldata~lo~

union's 4,300 hectares.

The

were not given any

reason for this change.

One may speculate that the risk of

failure was too great for the Ministry of Agriculture to invest its name and resources without providing an escape.
To carry out the project, the Hungarians had to convince
the

ejldata~lo~

that the project would bear results, for it

was necessary for them, to remove their fences and "compact"
individual plots of four hectares each into an extension of
land which would make the use of large machinery economically
feasible.

The person who carried most of the responsibility

for informing the individual

ejldata~lo~

about what the pro -

ject involved and enlisting their support was a social worker
from the Mexican Ministry of Agriculture who was assigned to
the union.

Armed with plans and projections, specifically

mentioning 15-16,000

pe~o~

per hectare as the anticipated

yield, she succeeded in convincing a sufficient number of
ejldata~lo~

to participate and the preparation of the lands

for cultivation began.
An immediate problem was created by the non-participation
of the

ejldata~lo~

of El Molino, who waited until the expen-

sive process of preparing the land for cultivation was complete, at which point they planted sorghum and in effect
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dropped out of the project.

Thus the Hungarians continued

with only two ejido~, the old enemies of Huejotitan and Zapotitan.
There were other setbacks in the first part of 1980 which
cannot be dealt with at length here.

The government changed

the personnel in positions of direct contact with the ejidaia~io~

on several occasions and created a legacy of discon-

tinuity.

Some of these changes were positive, as in the case

of the first organizers who spent six months in Jocotepec
without doing any organizing.

But other personnel changes

were disastrous, as in the case of a new representativ e of
the Ministry of Agriculture who, at a meeting in which the
assembled ejido members of Zapoti tan wanted to know the net
result of the harvest, set out to lecture them on the benefits
of the Agricultural Development Law (LFA).

The meeting al-

most ended in violence and with it the Hungarian Project in
that ejido.
Moreover, the Mexican government failed to deliver the
promised works of infrastructure, especially the drainage
ditches that were necessary to carry the runoff from the
mountains during the spring rains.

Without the ditches, one-

third of the approximately 1,000 hectares was flooded, resuIting in the loss of much of the corn.

The Hungarians

salvaged what they could as forage.
A third set of problems concerning the machinery and
seeds the union bought also decreased the yield of corn.

The

Hungarians favored John Deere tractors but a representative
of the Mexican Ministry of Agriculture insisted on Massey-
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Ferguson tr ac tors, which proved defective.

The seed used was

bought from North ru p King and it turned out that this seed
had been inadver tently cross-fertilized at the plant and did
not produce as we ll as it should have.
concerning the faulty seed

(A l awsuit was filed

because Northrup King first pro-

mised to deliver new seed for the 1981-82 cycle and then
reneged.)
The harvest took place in January and February of 1981,
over a month l ater than in previous years, as the

ejidata~io~

had to await the authorization of the Minis tr y of Agriculture
to begin the harvest.

The pr im ary reason for the delay was

the moisture conten t of the corn.

Because t he corn was to be

sold to CONASUPO , the state -run food distribution system,
they had to wait until the corn met CONASUPO's moisture stan dards.

Due to the delay, more of the corn was lost to fires

of unknown and s uspicious origin.
Another reversal occurred at this time, p l acing the en tire project in doubt.

Even before the harvest was in, the

Hungarian technicians received a lett er from the Mexican Ministry of Agriculture that announced the termination of the fiveyear contract at the end of the first year , citing budgetary
constraints.

Because the project was entirely consistent wit h

SAM and the LFA, and because the state had just announced the
l argest -ev er budget for agriculture in Mexican history, this
explanat i on convinced no one.

It seems more likely that the

Hungarians' success caused some people in the Min i stry of
Agriculture to believe that t heir work was being undermined,
and by foreigners!

As a result, the project was to continue ,
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but under the direction of Mexican agronomists and technicians.
These specialists were not familiar with the Hungarian techniqu es to be employed in subsequent phases of the project and
it was feared that the five-year agroindustrial project would
be frozen in its first phase.

The leader of the ejido of

Huejotitan, Felipe Estevez, accused the president of the union,
Juan Arroyo, of running off the Hungarians.
Not until the final results of the 1980-81
did these events make sense.

cycle carne in

The most important news, which

everyone had been waiting for, was the net income per hectare.
Whereas the social worker, citing the figures g iven her by
the Ministry of Agriculture, had proposed around 15,000

pe~o~

per hectare (about $650 per hectare at the exchange rate prevailing at the time), the actual income was only half of that.
An accounting of income and expenses shows what happened:
Income

Sale of corn
Sale of forage
Other sales

14,113,475.74
3,246,596.10
3 2 824,640.62

Total sales

21,184 ,70 8.46

pe~o~

pe~o~

E.x.pen~e~

Storage
2,108.09
Office equipment
23,851.80
Tools
30,999.67
Financial expenses
450 . 00
Administration
273,934.03
Operating expenses
13,714,377.27
Other expenses
2,701.00
Payments advanced to union 3 2 711,097.4 8
Total expenses
18,528,929.90

pe~o~

pe~o~

The difference between income and expenses, added to the
payment advanced to the

ejidata~io~,

amounts to 6,367,876.04
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P~404,

or about $265,000.

Although the income was less than anticipated, the ex penses charged against the union were what caused the alarm
among the

~jidaia~io4.

the sale of forage.

The sale of corn is obvious, as is

The " other sales" entry partly corres-

ponds to the profits the union realized by operating as an
agent for the state-run fertilizer company, Fertimex.
bly a million

P~404

Possi-

were contributed by SAM in support of

the cultivation of staple foods.
The

~jidaia~io4

were at a loss to explain some of the

expenses charge d against them.

The office equipment had

been promised by the Ministry of Agriculture, so they were
surprised to see this show up as a debit.

The large entry

for operating expenses was not further broken down, making
it impossible to tell what is being charged the union.

They

possi bl y were charged for drainage, even tho u g h this too was a
com mitment on the part of the Ministry of Ag riculture.

In

other words , the ministry washed its hands of the Hungarian
Project and charged what it could to the

~jidaia~io4.

No one was pleased with these figures.

The leader of

Huejotitan, Felipe Estevez , again accused the president of
union, Juan Arroyo, of malfea sance, which forced an audit
and delayed the announcement of the final fi g ures.

Arroyo

eventually was shown to be innocent of any wrongdoing.
social worker was even accused of misleadin g the

The

~jidaia~io4

with her optimistic projections of earnings , s upplied of
course b y her own ministry, and she concluded that her posi tion among them was so compromised by the turn of events tha t
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she tentatively decided to resign before the end of the
1981-82 cycle.
The quest ion that emerged was, how to proceed?

Further

cooperation wit h El Mo lin o and especially with Huejotitan
was virtually impossible for Zapotitan.

Both Zapotitan and

Huejotitan decided to reconstitute their respective lands as
product i on units under the Agricu ltu ra l
in dependently of each other.

Development Law, but

For undetermined reasons, the

Minister of Agriculture declared that i ndividual

~jido~

could

not form production units, that only two or more

~j id o~

or

individual

~jido~

with small property- owners could do so .

Consequently , these

~j ido ~

could not form separate producti on

units, although Zapotitan achieved virtually the same status
due to its excellent credit history.

At the time I left

Mexico , it was unclear how the machinery that the union pur chased would be divided among the new units, but one thing
was clear :

much of the machinery used in 1 980 - 81 had been

paid for and the

~jidata~io~

faced the 1981-82 cycle with

greater experience and on a stronger financial footing than
they had achieved in previous cycles.
It is interesting to note that in both
of

~jidata~ io ~

~jido~

the widows

pressured their leaders most effect i vely to

continue the project .

Despite the disappointments of 1980-

81, these women did better financially in participati ng in
the project and realizing six to seven thousand

p~~o~

per

hectare than i n renting their lands to others for perhaps

1,500

p~~o~

per hectare.
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Implications
I do not wish to offer premature conclusions for this
preliminary analysis.

Instead I prefer to discuss the im-

plications of this analysis as it now stands.
cations fall into three categories:

These impli-

first, what is likely to

happen during the next few years of the transformed Hungarian
Project, if it is not cancel l ed altogether; second, what are
the implications of SAM and the LFA for Mexico ' s food problems; and third, what does the analysis say about the future
relationi between the United States and Mexico.

These cate -

gories are arranged in decreasing order of certainty on my
part.
With regard to the future of the Hungarian Project, it
seems likely that it will remain in the first phase of increased productivity, at least until some other master plan
is articulated, when the entire project may suffer a vainglorious demise.

The vision of a complete agroindustry in

the valley, providing employment and better incomes for the
people of these communities, now seems completely implausible.
What is most worrisome is that Mexican agronomists and technicians from the Ministry of Agriculture and other ministries
will be directing the efforts of the

ejidata~io~.

They are

unfamiliar with the Hungarian techniques and are not committed
to them.

The ones I knew in 1981 seemed to pull the

ejido~

in different directions, representing different bureaucratic
interests:

the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of
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Agrarian Reform and the Rural Bank.
Even if the project is stillborn, . the ejido of Zapotit~~
will be in a relatively goo d position for the next few years.
The

ejidaia~io~

ga ined important experience in 1980-81, as

they virtually carried the entire project.

Even if they did

not realize the net income which they anticipated, their
financial situation is sound in that they can acquire literally
all the financing they need from Banrural, the state bank for
rural development .

Even if SAM were to be terminated, and

even under tEB LFA, which appears to have excluded them,
they probably will do well, at least compared to other
in the area.

ejido~

Their leadership is better suited to the typ es

of rural development programs which the technocratic Mexican
state is likely to propose in the 1980s.

And since th e land

that is most subject to flooding is in the ejido of
Zapotit~n

Huejotit~n,

should do better on its own in 1981- 82 .

Huejotit~n,

in contrast, will probably not do well

because they did not ga in as much practical experience during
the last cycle.

Their lands are more subject to flooding.

Strong gro u p divisions exist within the ej ido.

And their

leader ship has been of a cacique-type, which may be less ef fective in technocratic Mexic o in the 1980s.

The la st state -

ment presupposes relatively consistent policies in the next
~exenio,

which the designation of Miguel de la Madrid as

President Jose Lopez Portillo's successor virtually assures.
I would like to turn to an issue which has not been ad dressed directly in this essay.

So far I have used th e term

"peasant" only descriptively, not analytically, to refer to
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anyone who lives in rural Mexico.

In part, I have done so

because this is how the term is used in the state policies
to which I have referred and by the
themselves

camp~~ino~.

~jidaia~io~,

who call

The issue which needs to be discussed

is whether SAM, the LFA and the Hungarian Project represent a
social transformation of the peasantry into something else.
Of course, since the Mexican Revolution of this century
and especially since the Agrarian Reform, the peasantry has
been defined by their relationship to the state, rather than
to landlords, especially in the Mexican West, where social
relations during the

Po~ti~iaio

tral and southern Mexico.

The

differed from those of cen~jido,

it bears repeating,

was established as a legal person in the Constitution of 1917,
a status peasant communities never had in classic European
feudalism.

Indeed, SAM was touted as the forging of a new

alliance between the state and the peasant, as suggested in
the slogan,

"7~aio

Limpio con ~g Camp~~ino" ("Clean Treatment

for the Peasant").
The identity of the

~jidaia~io~

as peasants does not seem

a problem among the people of Zapotitan and , in many regards,
they are now operating as a society of petty entrepreneurs.
This identity, however, is problematical for the

~jidaia~io~

of Huejotitan, who expressed their resistance to the Hungarian
Project in terms of their fear of being transformed into pro letarians (jo~nag~~o~) working their own lands.

I do not

interpret this fear in terms of attachment to the land or
peasant autonomy.
with security.

The issue, I believe, is gainful employment

Felipe Estevez of Huejotitan once complained
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bitterly to me not of the lack of peasant autonomy but of
the lack of jobs in his town.

He pleaded for any kind of

program which would bring employment to Huejotitan and he made
disparaging remarks about ~rnigr€s who returned to this town
from the United states for visits

only to parade their

material wealth and ridicule the poverty of those who had
stayed behind .
How does one account for this difference of perspective
between the ~jidata~io~ of Huejotitan and those of Zapotitan?
It might seem quite ordinary to suggest that leadership is
the issue, but I believe that it is.

Again , I do not mean

leadership in the abstract sense of policymaking but in the
concrete sense of relations of production.

To take the exam -

ples of Felipe Estevez and Juan Arroyo, both are what Gramsci
has called organic intellectuals, in the sense of persons
arising in a particular social class who elaborate and arti culate a particular interpretation of their class
and propose means to deal with it.

9

predicament

They certainly are not

traditional intellectuals who are tied to society's institutions.

Juan Arroyo more closely approximates the organic in-

tellectual than does Felipe Estevez, who is compromised by
his shrouded dealings with officialdom.

Juan Arroyo advocates

careful collaboration with the state and he easily is an equal
to the state's local representatives in maneuvering within
established channels.

His experience and understated per-

sonal style make him indispensable in his community.

It is

doubtful that any of his immediate group, with whom he gracefully shares power, could readily take his place.

Felipe
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Estevez is a cautious co - conspirator who , as I suggested
earlier, rules through fear .

The social worker told me that

when one person in Huejotitan expressed to her vague opposi tion to Estevez in a private conversation , she encouraged him
to speak out publicly, to which he replied that she did not
know what things were like in Huejotitan when she was not
around .

Although no one else I knew had his charisma , there

very probably are several persons who could take his place ,
for the state has its ways of conjuring up such individuals.
There is no doubt that SAM , the LFA and the Hungarian
Project are having a great impact upon the
of Jocotepec.
formation:

ejido~

and people

The ultimate question is one of social trans-

does the technocratic character of the contem-

porary Mexican state mean that these " peasants" wil l

be pau -

perized and proletarianized , as may well happen in Huejotitan
if the Hungarian Project fails, or will the y be transformed
into petty, collective entrepreneurs , as appears to be
occurring in Zapotitan?

In either case , current models of

peasantries which stress subsistence orientation are unlikely
to be of asststance .
The second implication I will discuss concerns the
technical rather than the social orientation of the model of
development that is implicit in this project and in other ac tiviti es sponsored by SAM and the LFA.

During the twentieth

century, many observers of Mexican society and history have
observed that the ultimate hope for Mexico was the ejido.
Of course , these observers have differed with regard to what
they consider the advanta g es of the ejido.

Now , in the 1980s,
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it may seem that SAM and the LFA signify that Mexico is
turning away from the ejido to high technology solutions for
development.

In particular, the intensive use of petroleum-

based fertilizers and pesticides, not to mention large, expen sive machinery, might sound like precisely the wrong kind of
development.

Why not employ ecologically sound, intermediate

technology and organic methods more in accordance with the
existing social relations among peasants?

These questions

seem especially appropriate for Mexico, whose petroleum reserves are predicted to last for about 40 years.

What happens

to high -t echnology Mexico when the oil runs out?
I would like to suggest that the wisdom of "little is
better," as broadcast from wealthy, industrialized countries
like the United States, is perceived quite differently in the
so - called Third World.

More precisely, the anti - high-tech -

nology argument sounds to people in the Third World like
another attempt to keep them from sharing in the material
comforts of the modern world.

After all, we are telling them

what to do again and we are not following our own advice!
From Mexico ' s perspective, the insistence upon hightechnology solutions for the country ' s woes is entirely understandable, as a contradictory move in a contradictorY world.
This logic is most easily stated in terms of the alternative
of not following a high-technology model .

The features of

SAM and the LFA make it clear that social relations in Mexico,
particularly in the countryside, are so potentially explosive
that only a massive technical solution is possible .

A tech-

nical solution, of course, appears not to change the pre-
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existing social balance, at least not in the short run, the
wayan authentic agrarian reform or even an enclosure move ment might .

So in the first place, the high-t echnology al -

ternative is dictated by the existing relations between social
classes in Mexico .
Mexican leaders understand quite wel l

that the golden

ear of oil is finite and has certain negative consequences ,
referred to as the " petrolization" or even the "Ir anification "
of the Mexican economy.

As stated earlier, the current esti -

mate is that Mexico will not run out of oil for 40 years .
Their sensitivity to this issue is reflected in the joke
that was going around Mexico last year , to the effect that
due to the inferior academic training of Mexican economists ,
there had been a sl i ght miscalculation of the time the oil
reserves would last.

The decimal point had been misplaced ,

such that the actual period was on l y four, not 40, years .
The irony of this joke makes it patently clear how sensitive
Mexicans are to the uncertainty of a future dependent upon
oil.
For Mexicans , the question is one of what is worse , conserving the oil and failing to take advantage of the historical
moment , or using the oil now and figuring out what to do when
the oil runs out at that time?

At a time when nuclear power

is on the wane in the United States , it i s being actively
promoted in Mexico , as a means of slowing down the exploi tation of oil and offering an alternative to gas-fired elec trical plants when the gas is gone .

In other words , their

attitude is, let's do it now and work out the ensuing problems
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when we have to.

The only restriction placed on this k in d

of growth is to make certain that the growth does not get
out of hand and incit e another revolution.
As contradictory as this may sound, I do not see how we
could expect them to do otherwise.

For Mexico to adopt an

interm ediate -t echno lo gy solution now, without havin g gone
through a high-technology phase , is to condemn it to an
eternal position of inferi ori ty, especially
their powerful neighbor to the north.

.

,

.

v~~-a-v~~

They will not do it.

Finally, I will circle back to the international implications of SAM and the LFA, particularly regarding relations
between Mexico and the United Sta t es .

Oil obvious l y is the

basis of Mexico 's newly acquired prestige and power in the
New World .

President Lopez Portillo has manipulated this

leverage with admirable skill , using the sale of crude oil
at below - market prices as a kind of foreign aid to its poorer
neighbors.

As a consequence, a policy like SAM is im portan t

to the entire Third World.

For Mexico to re - establis h food

self - sufficiency, at a time when organizations such as the
Inter - American Development Bank are calling on Latin American
countries to forget about self-suffici ency and be satisfied
with relative food security , is a tremendous ges tur e on the
part of the second most dynamic economy in Latin Amer i ca .
Obviously, the Mexicans are anxious not to fail, as failure
now means not only eating U.S. gra in s but having their faces
rubbed in the mud.

Consequentl y and understandably, they are

cautious about programs like the Hungarian Project, which
might be interpreted as suggestin g that Mexico cannot do it
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alone and must depend upon outsiders for help.

SAM is

Mexico putting it to Uncle Sam with flare and grace.

The

LFA is a less publicized tool to guarantee that result.
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